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The paper presents color as a case study for the analysis of phenomena that pertain to
several levels of reality and are typically framed by different sciences and disciplines. Color,
in fact, is studied by physics, biology, phenomenology, and esthetics, among others. Our
thesis is that color is a different entity for each level of reality, and that for this reason
color generates different observables in the epistemologies of the different sciences.
By analyzing color as a paradigmatic case of an entity naturally spreading over different
levels of reality, the paper raises the question as to whether making explicit the usually
implicit ontological assumptions embedded within the different observables exploited
by the different sciences may eventually clarify some of the difﬁculties of developing a
comprehensive theory of color.
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INTRODUCTION
What is color? Is it a quality of the phenomenal (subjective)
appearance or a property of the physical object? Or both? How
are the phenomenal quality and the physical property related to
each other? As well known, widely different answers have been
provided. Among them are the following: color realism based on
the reﬂectance of light by surfaces, that is, physics; phenomenal
objectivism based on sensory-motor contingencies; color subjec-
tivism based on qualia, i.e., atomic color experiences; color as
brain product based on the effects of objects within us, from the
point of view of the nervous system; and color dispositionalism
based on the effects of objects within us, from the point of view
of our experiential states (on the different epistemological stances
see Byrne and Hilbert, 1997).
Consequently, theories on these various matters have analyzed
aspects concerning the nature of stimuli, the workings of the
neurons, sensory response, the eminently qualitative nature of
phenomenal vision, or aesthetic yield. But on establishing cor-
relations among events at these various levels, one should be
careful to avoid epistemologically collapsing their relations of
ontological dependence into reductions to either the physical or
the neuronal level (Albertazzi, 2006, 2013). In fact, as Köhler
wrote
If someone states that things seen must ﬁrst be experienced as if they
were in the brain, he has not realized that the ﬁrst part of his statement
refers to the visual ﬁeld as a fact of experience, whilst in the second part,
where he uses the expression “the brain,” he is speaking of a physical
object in physical space. Thismeans that he expects to see parts of visual
space localized in relation to parts of physical space, and this notion is
entirely impossible.
(Köhler, 1947, p. 213)
The discussion on color continues to suffer from the same
shortcomings as denounced by Köhler. It still lacks, for example:
• A categorical classiﬁcation of the differences among the phys-
ical, the neuronal, and the properly psychic (mental) marking
the onset of color perceptions.
• A distinction between the color stimuli and subjective color
conditions of perceptibility (for example, the assimilative
phenomena in color appearances, the role of subjective inte-
grations, the capacity to understand such aspects of colors as
the difference betweenwarmand coldor light andheavy colors).
• A precise terminology according to the different levels of
analysis, relatively to the different color “observables.”
• An explicit correlation between models of color and the speciﬁc
color observables to which they refer.
The thesis put forward in this study is that only the framework
provided by a properly developed theory of levels of reality can handle
the complexity of color perception and color spaces. The assumption,
however, is that the different color observables are not totally inde-
pendent from one another, in the sense that they are connected
by a network of dependencies arising from the different levels of
reality.
As a step toward understanding and clarifying the nature of
color, this paper suggests verifying whether at least some of the
controversial aspects of color understanding depend on different
ontological (not epistemological) assumptions. Otherwise stated,
we propose to bracket the models’ epistemological assumptions as
far as is possible in order to better grasp the possible presence of
underlying ontological differences.
Color perception is characterized by the presence of differ-
ent theories based on conﬂicting primitives (wavelength, neural
correlates, color appearances), and parameters (hue, saturation,
chroma, brightness, lightness, to mention but a few). Further-
more, a variety of color solids have been proposed as models of
the space of colors, including cylindrical, conic, pyramidal, and
spherical ones (Billmeyer, 1987). Moreover, even when the dif-
ferent theories adopt the same categories, they deﬁne them in
different and often conﬂicting ways.
To make matters worse, even the identiﬁcation of colors raises
major problems: to wit, the color matching procedure, on which
most colorimetry is based (Boynton, 1979; Brainard, 1995; Koen-
derink andvanDoorn,2003; Koenderink,2010), exploits a severely
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restricted use of color terms and does not consider what the viewer
actually perceives, with the exception of the viewpoint of color
differences. The phenomenological aspects of observed colors
(Stumpf, 1917; Hering, 1920, 1964; Gelb, 1929; Katz, 1935) remain
hidden behind the yes/no responses to just noticeable differences
(jnd – the units of psychophysical analysis).
The question also arises as how to relate natural language
color terms for perceived dimensions of color, i.e., relatively to
what kinds of concepts are encoded or not encoded by languages,
what are the ontological referents, in what universal and lin-
guistic (or culture-speciﬁc) meanings consist, etc. The so-called
nature/nurture debate in the ﬁeld of colors is particularly difﬁ-
cult to address, given the tangled development of the taxonomy
of colors over time and in the different languages (Williams,
1976; Dedrick, 1998; Paramei, 2007; Jameson and Komarova,
2009; Rakhilina and Paramei, 2011), the terminology adopted by
scientiﬁc theories that may deﬁne colors according to metrical
parameters or differently shaped color spaces, and the question
of how the subjective perception of color relates to cross-cultural
color naming (Jameson, 2005). Furthermore, many more colors
exist perceptively than can be linguistically named (Kuehni, 2007,
2010). The problem is that there are not enough terms to qual-
ify color appearances in simple, precise, and exhaustive terms, if
necessary.
Scientiﬁcnomenclatures usually adopt severely constrained sets
of basic terms and qualiﬁers. While this may be appropriate for
speciﬁc uses, such as industrial ones, it is too coarse to capture
distinctions that people spontaneously make.
Color nomenclatures usually apply to isolated, uniform
patches, or the very simplest conﬁgurations of color mondrians.
Moreover, special color nomenclatures refer to colors pertaining
to particular areas of the entire space of colors. A color nomencla-
ture typically relies on a highly simpliﬁed framework based on a
small number of qualiﬁers and their combinations (for instance,
“red,” “deep red,” “dark red,” “light red,” etc.). These labels are
the linguistic translations of numerical expressions. That is, they
are operational deﬁnitions that do not consider the correlation
between perception of color and the linguistic expression that best
matches the perception. Perception, depending on different set-
tings, including the physical and the mental, often leads to color
terms that do not ﬁt into acknowledged standards.
COLORS AND COLOR TERMS
The CIE (Commission Internationale de l’Eclairage, International
Commission of Illumination) deﬁnition of color runs as follows:
Color (perceived) is the “characteristic of visual perception that
can be described by attributes of hue, brightness (or lightness) and
colourfulness (or saturation or chroma; see International Lighting
Vocabulary [ILV], 2011; Standard CIE S 017/E:2011). A series of
notes (http://cie.co.at/index.php?i_ca_id=827) clarify that: “when
necessary, to avoid confusion between othermeanings of theword,
the term “perceived color” may be used (note 1); that “perceived
color depends on the spectral distribution of the color stimulus,
on the size, shape, structure, and surround of the stimulus area,
on the state of adaptation of the observer’s visual system, and on
the observer’s experience of the prevailing and similar situations
of observation” (note 2); and that “perceived color may appear
in several modes of color appearance. The names for various
modes of appearance are intended to distinguish among quali-
tative and geometric differences of color perceptions. Some of the
more important terms of the modes of color appearance are given
in ‘object color,’ ‘surface color,’ and ‘aperture color.’ Other modes
of color appearance include ﬁlm color, volume color, illuminant
color, body color, and Ganzfeld color. Each of these modes of
color appearance may be further qualiﬁed by adjectives to describe
combinations of color or their spatial and temporal relationships.
Other terms that relate to qualitative differences among colors per-
ceived in variousmodes of color appearance are given in‘luminous
color’, ‘non-luminous color,’ ‘related colour,’ and ‘unrelated color”’
(note 4).
However, color terms can only be linguistic labels of perceived
appearances of colors, not of physical stimuli because we do not
perceive physical stimuli as such. If anything, we perceive colors as
a consequence of physical stimulation. Also in this respect, how-
ever, the relation between physical stimuli and color appearances is
less direct than one might think, or can be taken for granted, given
the strong contextual dependence of color appearances (Chevreul,
1839; Albers, 1963). It is our suggestion that grounding color
nomenclature on the perceptual experience of subjects provides
models more robust than those based on an automatic transla-
tion of numerical expressions or geometrical positions in a color
space. From this emerges the need to arrive at a robust perceptual
deﬁnition of color terms.
Natural languages use different types of color terms (Biggam,
2012). Since Berlin and Kay’s (1977) seminal book, the literature
has drawn on a variety of different methodologies ranging from
purely linguistic analyses (Wierzbicka, 2006), to anthropological
ﬁeld researches (MacLaury et al., 2007),mainly with the subminis-
tration of Munsell chips1 (Berlin and Kay, 1977; MacLaury, 1992;
Davidoff et al., 1999), and Osgood’s semantic differential (Mad-
den et al., 2000). More recently, results from the neurosciences
have begun to be used (Kay and McDaniel, 1978; Wuerger et al.,
2005). For an extensive review of the different universalist and
relativist positions see Da Pos and Albertazzi (2007).
Speciﬁcally, as regards basic color terms2, natural languages seg-
ment color appearances according to identiﬁable patterns. Most
languages broadly agree on the prototypicality of linguistic cate-
gories for so-called focal colors (Rosch, 1973; Rosch et al., 1976).
However, agreement on what aspects are the proper referents of
color terms in natural languages is still lacking, because differ-
ent models refer to different parameters or different aspects of
color. Most of the dispute between universalists and relativists
on color terms, for example, arises because the exponents of
each perspective use concepts of color referring to different real-
ities, including stimuli, neural correlates, and color appearances.
The usual recourse in these cases to qualiﬁers such as “‘unique,”
“pure,”“primary,”“elementary,”“basic,”“focal,” and “prototypical”
is widely insufﬁcient, because these qualiﬁers are themselves far
from being univocal. A more systematic framework is needed.
1That is, the hues presented in his Notation book, see Munsell (1905).
2That is, universal color categories assumed to be present in most languages, and in
a highly constrained order; (see Berlin and Kay, 1977; Kay and McDaniel, 1978; Kay
and Regier, 2006, 2007).
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To present one of the customary confusions in addressing col-
ors, it is enlightening to consider the difference between hue and
color. Unique (also known as unitary or psychologically primary)
colors (Hering, 1920) are colors which do not resemble any other
colors, whilst binary, or psychologically mixed colors resemble
at least two others. The deﬁnition is based on the visual simi-
larity which a color shows, or does not show, with other colors,
obtained by pure phenomenological observation. The system of
color notation closest to the perception of colors based on their
visual similarity is the Natural Color System (NCS, Sivik, 1991).
In the NCS, reference to unique hues amounts to reference to yel-
low, red, blue, and green, while reference to unique colors includes
also the achromatic white and black; in fact, from a phenomeno-
logical viewpoint, black and white are also perceived as colors.
The categories of color and hue are not easily deﬁnable, however.
Prima facie we might deﬁne color as everything that is directly
seen, i.e., as the color appearance – deﬁned in CIE as the “aspect of
visual perception by which things are recognized by their color” –
while hue is the aspect possessed by many colors and which makes
them chromatic, distinguishing them from non-chromatic colors.
A speciﬁc hue is more or less visible in a particular color, in the
sense that two colors can be of the same hue: one can see the pres-
ence of more red in a highly chromatic color of red hue than in a
scantily chromatic color of the same hue (for instance in a whitish
pink), although the hue of both is simply red. On the other hand,
one can also say that the color most representative of redness is a
highly chromatic red. In linguistic terms, talk of a focal color as
the most representative color of a category (“the best cues of the
category,” according to Rosch’s prototypical classiﬁcation; Rosch,
1973; Rosch et al., 1976) makes reference to the color with which
the word“red”ﬁts best. In fact, focal color is the color in which one
sees what one considers the best red, not a color which belongs to
the red hue, which is reddest because it is less blue and less yellow.
It is worth noting that the “best” red, differently form “unique”
red, can bear cultural connotations as well.
Highly chromatic colors belonging to a bipolar scale between
two consecutive hues show different degrees of similarity with the
extreme colors of that interval. For instance, the interval deﬁned
by the extremes “most chromatic yellow” and “most chromatic
red” in which mixed colors appear more or less yellowish or more
or less reddish – i.e., are similar to one or the other color in differ-
ent ways – show different degrees of similarity with the extreme
colors of that interval. Linguistically, these intermediate colors
can be expressed, for example, in terms of “red and yellow,” “saf-
fron,”“pumpkin,”“orange,”“carrot,” etc. Not necessarily, however,
do these color terms have the same referent, and some may also
overlap. For example, a color may appear more or less red either
because it is pink or because it is orange: in the former case, the
hue is maximally red but little visible (the color is only slightly
chromatic); in the latter case, the hue is not very red and the color
may be highly chromatic. Consequently, one assesses pink as “very
red”because it is only slightly or not at all yellow or blue; and like-
wise one assesses orange as only slightly red because the “hue” is
not very red. However, it seems that one can also make an absolute
assessment of how much a color is red, so that orange and pink
might be treated equivalently, i.e., the extent to which red (not
hue) is visible in them.
The perceptual similarity of the mixed hues to the extremes
“red” and “yellow” can be quantiﬁed (for instance, halfway in the
interval (50–50); or more yellowish than reddish (say, 70–30);
and so on. Needless to say, different similarity metrics can be
developed.
The problem of the perceptual identiﬁcation and denomina-
tion of colors is particularly complex in the case of mixed colors,
such as orange. To be noted is that Berlin and Kay’s (1977; see
also Kay and Mafﬁ, 1999) eleven basic color terms include both
unique colors such as white, black, red, yellow, green, and blue
(the ﬁrst six colors in their list), and mixed colors such as orange.
According to Sternheim and Boynton (1966), however, when the
orange response category is available in a judgment experiment
on the color continuum together with the response categories for
red, yellow, and green, orange is used with the lowest reliability,
i.e., randomly. When the orange response category is omitted, the
hues otherwise associated with orange are completely dispersed
into the red and the yellow, though with peaks in either red or
yellow. Sternheim and Boynton (1966) therefore conclude that
orange is some combination of red and yellow, and that the hues
associated with the long wavelength part of the spectrum3 can
be described without the category of orange, and making use of
two already known color terms (yellow and red). The superﬂu-
ous nature of the category “orange” was questioned by Boyton
himself in a later study. He interviewed Japanese subjects, who
were required to express their degree of agreement on the exis-
tence of speciﬁc categories related to Berlin and Kay’s basic color
terms. For 90% of the subjects, the category of orange was well
categorized as a salient color, and the category was linguistically
expressed by mono-lexemic typical terms different from red and
yellow (Uchikawa and Boynton, 1987).
This would imply that, phenomenologically, “orange” lies
exactly midway between the two pure colors of red and yellow
(on the status of “orange” from the point of view of painters,
see Garau, 1993). Whenever orange varies from the mid-point
between red and yellow, the resulting color is described as yellow-
ish red or reddish yellow, as are the other mixed hues of the same
range.
NOMENCLATURES
One of the problems raised by the relationship between color
perception and color terms is whether perceptual categorization
requires linguistic categories at all. That is: do perceptual cate-
gories depend on language, learning and higher cognition, or are
they independent from them? Munsell chips are deﬁnitely too
poor a tool with which to verify this issue experimentally (Lucy
and Shweder, 1979; Wierzbicka, 1996, 2006; Lucy, 1997). Testing
the possible inﬂuence of language on color perception requires a
more sophisticated experimental setting, such as having several
words available for, say, red, in order to signal different environ-
mental conditions (Green-Armytage, 2006; Winawer et al., 2007).
In fact, as we have already noted, there is an indeﬁnite num-
ber of color appearances, more than any natural language may
encode. Therefore, the question arises as to how to relate natural
3The expression in Sternheim and Boynton’s paper is unfortunate, because the study
refers to “perceived” colors.
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language terms for perceived colors and the terminology adopted
by scientiﬁc theories.
Scientiﬁcnomenclatures usually adopt severely constrained sets
of basic terms and qualiﬁers. Four different spaces should be taken
into account: (1) The space of colorimetry (to be noted, however,
is that there are colorimetric spaces, such as CIELAB and CIECAM
(respectively Lab Color Space and Color Appearance Model both
published by CIE), that (do not perfectly) represent perceived col-
ors, (2) the physiological space LMS (color space based on human
cone cells – LMS stands for L- M- and S-cones) and its derivate
DKL (Derrington–Krauskopf–Lennie color space), (3) the space
of the linguistic representation of colors, and (4) the space of the
subjective perception of colors.
To be noted is that the phenomenological perspective under
(4), thus far rarely adopted, is starting to attract attention (Sivik,
1974, 1997; Albertazzi et al., 2012).
For each of these spaces, different theories are customarily
developed. Each space requires speciﬁc groups of observables. The
main issue is that most of the contemporary literature fails to dis-
tinguish them as clearly as needed, and therefore has difﬁculties
in addressing the problem of their relations. Since colors, what-
ever they are, are also, and we would say primarily, a question
of perception, one may wonder whether starting from real (i.e.,
subjective) perceptual experience of color provides information
that may escape or remain hidden if one instead starts from other
frameworks.
COLOR PRIMITIVES
Color theories use different primitives – and even when they use
the same terms, theymaydeﬁne themdifferently. It is consequently
mandatory to be clear about the different terminologies and the
ways in which different theories use any given term.
It is generally assumed that color can be described according to
the parameters of hue, brightness and saturation (Kuehni, 2003;
on measurement see Krantz et al., 1989)4. These properties make
explicit reference to the relation between a given stimulus (hue
correlated with wavelength, brightness correlated with luminance,
saturation correlated with purity) and the subsequent subjective
experience of a perceiver. On the other hand (see above), it is also
often taken for granted that hue, brightness, and saturation are
attributes of the color as perceived; also taken for granted is what
they are correlated with, and what they correspond to; and that
they form a 3D space where each of them represents a distinct
dimension. These parameters result from innumerable experi-
ments on the physical stimuli, i.e., light spectra, or the power
at each wavelength. As it happens, light spectra can be readily
measured and characterized by three numbers (the so-called tris-
timulus values of light). However, the shift is constantly made
from properties of light spectra (as measured by the tristimulus
values) to properties of the surfaces of seen objects (Wyszecki and
Stiles, 1982; Hurlbert, 2013). It is customarily claimed that the
tristimulus values specify the response of the standard human eye
to the color spectrum. This standard response, however, is far from
4Alternative names for “saturation” are “colorfulness,” “intensity,” and “purity.”
Munsell uses instead a different primitive, namely “chroma”; “chromaticness” in
NCS. See below for a brief reconstruction of their meaning.
providing a general answer to the ways in which human eyes per-
ceive colors, because the determination of the tristimulus values
requires highly speciﬁc and severely constrained conditions, i.e.,
generally isolated colors. To provide an example, visual percep-
tion in complex environments where phenomena of contrast and
assimilation regularly occur is purposely never taken into consid-
eration: in fact, one of the major self-imposed limits adopted by
colorimetric analysis is that it should consider only isolated colors,
without taking colors combined with other colors into account
(Boynton, 1979).
The problems are compounded because the literature on color
deﬁnes hue, brightness, and saturation in different, often mutu-
ally incompatible, ways. Furthermore, although the distinction
among hue, saturation and brightness is correct as far as the prop-
erties of light are concerned, it is far from being a “natural” –
i.e., “phenomenological” – distinction from the point of view of
the perceiver (Stumpf, 1917, p. 8; Katz, 1935). Saturation, for
example, is a technical term used to characterize decontextualized
light stimuli. According to the CIE deﬁnition of saturation, it is
“the colourfulness of an area judged in proportion to its bright-
ness” [1136], and in a note it is speciﬁed that “For given viewing
conditions and at luminance levels within the range of photopic
vision, a colour stimulus of a given chromaticity exhibits approx-
imately constant saturation for all luminance levels, except when
the brightness is very high.” Originally introduced by Helmholtz
(1867) – explicitly aware of its arbitrariness from a perceptual
point of view – the property of saturation should measure the
degree of chromatic content in proportion to the brightness of a
color. However, Wyszecki and Stiles (1982) note that the concept
of saturation (together with the concept of chroma) is perhaps
the most controversial concept in the literature on color appear-
ance. In fact, different systems of color representation differ as
to their primitives: for example, one ﬁnds chroma in Munsell
and Sättigung in Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN)5. Since
the deﬁnition of saturation changes relatively to the color model
adopted, the “‘usual” deﬁnition of saturation as the “colorful-
ness” (Hunt, 1986) of a color in relation to its “brightness,” or
the degree of departure from the gray with the same lightness
(all grays having zero saturation), is of little help (Mausfeld,
2003).
Finally, the different meanings of “saturation” or “chroma” are
not limited to the different color systems in which they appear.
Saturation, in fact, is confused with another phenomenological
aspect of color, its insistence or forcefulness, i.e., the fact that a
color appearsmore vivid or brighter in theﬁeld (Katz,1935). These
qualities of color carry emotional and affordance-type informa-
tion like the difference between cold and warm colors (Ou et al.,
2004a,b; Xin et al., 2004; Da Pos and Green-Armytage, 2007; Da
Pos and Valenti, 2007) and the difference between light and heavy,
large and small colors (Arnheim et al., 1954/1974; Itten, 1961),
and they concern the theory of the harmonic dimensions of color
(Burchett, 2007).
5DIN is based on a circle of 24 color-hues, a saturation scale, and a darkness
scale as a special parameter for establishing the relative brightness of non-self-
illuminating colors (i.e., colors that are illuminated by an external source). See
http://www.colorsystem.com/?page_id=948&lang=en.
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In past years, “brightness” was sometimes even used as syn-
onymous with “lightness,” which fortunately is no longer the case.
From a perceptual point of view, “brightness” is an attribute of
the light that reaches the eye from a surface, while “lightness”
refers to the colors of an object, i.e., it is an attribute of a sur-
face. Lightness is an observable referring to white, understood as
the color with the highest lightness (100%). It follows that the
lightness of chromatic colors and grays is always less than 100%.
Lightness then corresponds to the reﬂectance of a surface, a prop-
erty of distal stimulus – that is, a phenomenologically inaccessible
property. Using brightness and lightness as synonymous would
therefore merge two different observables: an observable of light
and an observable of surface. To further compound the confusion,
“brightness” may be also used for surfaces, thereby indicating the
more or less strong illumination (i.e., light) to which they are sub-
ject. In this latter case, many technicians prefer to use “luminance”
(therebynot referring to the correspondingperception, i.e., bright-
ness). Luminance, in fact, is a psychophysical property pertaining
to the stimulus, and not perceivable as such by a perceiver.
Finally, “brightness” is also used for the correlation between
the impression of lightness and luminance, where under the same
luminance colors of higher saturation appear brighter than colors
of low saturation (for example, the Helmholtz, Kohlrausch, and
Boswell illusion; see Kaiser, 1985).
FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS
The foregoing discussion has shown how tangled the “scientiﬁc”
analysis of colors is, and we have provided some evidence about
how different some of the presently most widely used theories
and approaches are. Some of their differences are due to prag-
matic factors such as the needs of the communities using them:
for instance, technicians requiring colorimetric data prefer to use
either the DIN, the Munsell, the CIELAB or CIECAM02 systems
(nowadays with a preference for the last). In one way or another,
all the systems need to take account of four different natural sys-
tems: physical radiation, physiological elaboration, perception,
and language. They differ as to where the focus falls, and therefore
in which other system(s) should be kept under control in order to
obtain the information they deemrelevant. Munsell,NCS,and also
OSA-UCS (Optical Society of America, Uniform Color Scale), for
example, have a phenomenological base, none of them is primar-
ily focused on physical radiation. Munsell, however, accepting the
Fechnerian psychometric law adopts a two-sided understanding
of perception, while the NCS adopts and develops a properly phe-
nomenological stance (perception as connected to what appears
to awareness), though ruled by psychometric principles.
The Munsell system constrains both psychological and linguis-
tic information: the former by showing individual chips, that is by
avoiding contextual inﬂuences on color, and the latter by admitting
only yes/no answers by the perceiver.
On the other hand, the NCS constrains the neurophysiological
base of perception and considers both the source and the neuronal
elaboration of the stimuli to be irrelevant. This is not to imply
that opponency has no neuronal correlates (Jameson and Hur-
vich, 1955; MacLeod and van der Twer, 2003; MacLeod, 2010).
The problem, however, is that anatomo-physiological substrates
cannot explain the phenomenological qualities of opponent colors
(Valberg, 2001; Kuehni, 2004). As a matter of fact, stimuli for the
NCS may arise from any source whatsoever (either “external” or
“internal”), and there may be different kinds of them.
By not constraining its phenomenological base, NCS seems to
better exploit the richness of bothperceptual experience and its lin-
guistic formulation: for example, the relation between warm and
cold colors and its linguistic expression (Hård and Sivik, 1981; Da
Pos andValenti, 2007). The very existence of NCS shows that phe-
nomenological observables can produce scientiﬁcally exploitable
models of color.
The problem remains of making sense of the variety of mod-
els. As said, some models are explicitly tailored to the needs of
speciﬁc communities of users, whilst others are more general in
nature. The question however is that all the major models suc-
ceed in capturing aspects of the enormously complex problem
of color perception. Finding a way to better codify the speciﬁc
points of view embedded in the various models and systematically
coordinate their outcomes may greatly deepen our understand-
ing of colors. Since the discussion has already shown not only
that the different models focus on different types of information,
but that these types pertain to different sciences (physics, biology,
psychology, linguistics – what in a more explicit philosophical par-
lance becomes the different levels of reality characterizing physical
waves, neurophysiological activities, perception, and language –
the question arises naturally whether a theory of the levels of real-
ity will indeed be able to clarify and connect, at least to some
degree, the different models.
APPROACHING LEVELS OF REALITY
Before presenting some aspects of the theory of levels of reality and
their relevance to our topic, some preliminary clariﬁcations on the
nature of ontological categories are needed. Needless to say, these
clariﬁcations are far from being anything like the presentation of
a full-ﬂedged, ontological framework. The economy of the paper
forces us to skip issues that a purely philosophical paper would
have to address. With these limitations, these clariﬁcations may
provide the required anchor points to an ontological framework
sufﬁciently general to clarify scientiﬁc models.
We distinguish between categories on the one hand, and
individuals on the other, as the entities to which categories
refer. Only individuals pertain to the furniture of the world.
Categories are not new entities added to the furniture of the
world; they are instead principles (or determinations) of the
individuals that they categorize. Individuals may be subdivided
between concreta and abstracta, and their categories between
real and ideal categories. Concreta and real categories pertain
to the ontology of real being, abstracta and ideal categories
to the ontology of ideal (or abstract) being. Universal cat-
egories comprise both concreta and abstracta, real and ideal
being. The partial ontology that we are presenting in this
paper deals with some aspects of real being only, namely
colors.
Moreover, the difference between the nature of categories as
principles and the often cumbersome process of their discovery
and reﬁnement should never be forgotten. The following quo-
tation aptly summarizes our own understanding of ontological
categories:
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“the categories with which . . . ontology deals are won neither by a
deﬁnition of the universal nor through derivation from a formal table
of judgment. They are rather gleaned step by step from an observation
of existing realities. And since, of course, this method of their discovery
does not allow for an absolute criterion of truth, here no more than
in any other ﬁeld of knowledge, it must be added that the procedure
of ﬁnding and rechecking is a laborious and cumbersome one. Under
the limited conditions of human research it requires manifold detours,
demands constant corrections, and, like all genuine scholarly work,
never comes to an end”
(Hartmann, 1975, p. 13–14).
One of the most difﬁcult problems faced by any ontology is
the answer to the following question “What are the individuals to
which ontological categories refer?” Two main positions compete;
one according to which ontological individuals are only atomic
entities, and one which accepts both atomic and molar entities.
The former position sees ontological categories as referring to
the most elementary components of the universe of discourse
(e.g., colors as captured by colorimetry), from which all the
other components should derive by composition or other suit-
able procedures. This is obviously the classic reductionist credo.
The alternative vision is more ﬂexible in the sense that it admits
a variety of ontological individuals, some of which may work at
molar levels of reality (e.g., colors as they appear in the environ-
ment, according to phenomena of assimilation and contrast). The
main problem facing this alternative vision is that no generally
accepted set of intermediate levels arise as the natural candidates
from which to start. To compound the difﬁculty, the various sci-
ences are such that a number of different levels present themselves
as “natural” starting points. Selecting any one of them rather than
any other is entirely arbitrary. Therefore, there is no saying that the
former position is much simpler and (apparently) more effective
than the latter. Notwithstanding all the difﬁculties encountered by
the reductionist strategy, many see the reduction to atoms or basic
individuals as a perhaps awkward but unavoidable TINA (There Is
NoAlternative) position. The underlying belief is that the difﬁcul-
ties arising from the reduction to atoms will eventually be solved
by more reﬁned strategies, such as new forms of composition.
The possibility is usually overcome that even if some individual
problem can be reductionistically analyzed, this does not neces-
sarily imply that a generic (that is universal) reductionist strategy
is available. Anyway, no patent decision procedure exists to help
seriously puzzled scholars to choose between the former and the
latter strategy. The unavailability of a proper decision procedure
means that in the end the decision depends on a choice that the
community of scholars has to take.
Our take on the issue is that the constraint forcing ontological
categories to refer to atoms only impoverishes reality in the sense
that information is lost and in the end authentic aspects of real-
ity are missed. Instead, an ontological framework acknowledging
both atomic and molar categories is both more general, in the sense
of being able to categorize a wider spectrum of real phenomena,
and more complex, in the sense of having to address many more
problems, such as the ontological nature of the relations between
different levels of reality.
This ontological framework systematically distinguishes
between “pure” (i.e., “general” or “universal”) categories and
“domain” (or “level”) categories. Keeping in mind this distinction
will avert misunderstandings, especially when categories like those
of space, time, and causation are introduced.
LEVELS OF REALITY
Today, levels of reality are mostly discussed under the rubrics of
“emergence” and “parts and wholes6.” In fact, the two most obvi-
ous strategies with which to approach levels are to divide the world
into hierarchies of entities (such as atom–molecule–cell, etc.) or
groups of properties (physical, biological, etc.). Not surprisingly,
the main distinction among theories of levels of reality closely
replicates the divide between entity-based and property-based
theories. It is also not surprising that the entity-based theory of
levels comes close to part-whole theories, and the property-based
theory of levels comes close to type theories. Their merits and
demerits notwithstanding, it is worth taking immediate note of
an underlying problem: in the above lists of entities/properties,
the exact meaning of the concluding “etc.” is unclear. Consider
the entity-based framework: let us suppose that the series “atom–
molecule–cell” will be at some point enlarged by the addition
of new entities such as “mind” or “society” (or suitable alterna-
tives). While there are prima facie plausible candidates for the
relation connecting the items“atom,”“molecule,” and“cell” (e.g., a
part–whole relation), the candidate relations for the new items are
remarkably less easy to detect. Similarly, the connections between
the properties characterizing “physical” and “biological” types are
much simpler (e.g., a subset-set inclusion) than the connections
between the properties characterizing the group comprising also
“psychological” and “social” types7.
Of the two main ontological acceptations of entity-based or
type-based theories of levels, the former, as said, comes close to
the theory of parts and wholes, and the latter to the theory of
ontological types. Let us adopt the latter option and understand a
level of reality as a group of (ontological) categories (Poli, 2001).
The next step is to distinguish universal categories, those that
pertain to the whole of reality, from level categories, those that
pertain to one or more levels, but not to all of them. The distinc-
tion among physical, biological, psychological, and social types
follows naturally. The subsequent step is to specify the relations
connecting the levels to each other. Contemporary theories of
levels of reality customarily exploit only one inter-level relation
(e.g., in the form of supervenience). As far as color is concerned,
for instance, its phenomenic appearance would be a supervenient
product over its physical basis. One of the reasons for rehabilitat-
ing Hartmann’s theory of levels (see note 6) is that his theory uses
two different inter-level relations and is therefore able to better
distinguish the differences between the physical and the biological
levels, on the one hand, and the biological and the psychologi-
cal levels on the other (Poli, 2006a,b,c, 2007). Provided that the
6In the English-speaking world, both strands of analysis have been stimulated by
inﬂuential papers by Hilary Putnam – notably Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and
Putnam (1961). Since them, an enormous discussion has developed, which cannot
be summarized here (for an old but still valuable survey, see Blitz, 1992). However,
as important as the discussion in English has been, it is worth noting that some
major pre-WWII contributions have never been taken into account, notably those
byNicolai Hartmann. SeeHartmann (1940, 1975),Werkmeister (1990), Poli (2012).
7Furthermore, beyond or above the distinction between entity-based and type-
based theories of levels of reality, other acceptations of levels often intrude, such as
notions of levels of organization, complexity or representation.
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theory is fully developed and updated to contemporary knowl-
edge, the two relations cover the connections between the physical
and the biological levels, on the one hand, and among the bio-
logical, psychological, and social (including language and culture)
levels on the other (Birren, 1969; Bornstein, 1973). With reference
to colors, the two mentioned relations respectively cover stimuli
(wavelengths) and their neuro-physiological elaboration (neural
correlates), on the one hand, and perceptual modes of appear-
ances of colors (Katz, 1935) and the relations among color terms
in natural languages on the other.
As said, the original theory of levels developed by Hartmann
is based on two different inter-level relations. Leaving universal
categories aside, the following two main categorical situations
can be distinguished: (a) Beings A and B are categorically dif-
ferent because the categories upon which the former is founded
are partially different from the categories upon which the latter
is founded, in the sense that the latter is founded on new cat-
egories (which implies that the latter includes at least a novum,
a new category not present in the former); (b) Beings A and B
are categorically different because the categories upon which the
former is founded and those upon which the latter is founded
form two entirely different (disjoint) groups of categories. Fol-
lowing Hartmann, the two relations can be termed respectively
relations of super-formation (Überformung) and super-position
(Überbauung ; Hartmann, 1940).
Super-formation [the type (a) form of dependence] is weaker
than super-position because it includes already actualized cat-
egories, those of the level below. Sufﬁce it to consider the
super-formation between molecules and cells, i.e., between the
physical and the biological levels of reality. In this regard, one can
mention that even if organisms are unquestionably more complex
than mechanisms, the behavior of organisms complies with the
laws of mechanics. On the other hand, the psychological and social
levels are different because they are characterized by an interrup-
tion in the categorical series and by the onset of new categorical
series (relative respectively to the psychological and social levels).
The relation between the biological level and the psychological
level, on the one hand, and the relation between the psychological
level and the social one, on the other, are both relations of super-
position. By way of example, the group of categories embedded
in psychological entities is different from the group of categories
embedded in biological entities. Similarly, the group of categories
embedded in social entities is different from the groupof categories
embedded in biological entities.
When the connecting relation is a relation of super-formation,
some categories of the lower level recur in the higher one. Recur-
ring categories interact with the categories of the higher level and
are, so to speak, contaminated by them; some of their moments
become different. Higher levels are never characterized by recur-
ring categories, however. Each level has its novum, the category
or group of categories that distinguishes the level from the lower
ones. The novum does not derive either from the elements of the
level or from their synthesis.
Two aspects characterize super-position relations: ﬁrst, the
categories embedded in the entities of the connected levels are
different (they are all nova); second, a relation of existential
dependence links the higher level to the lower one. Most details
of the links connecting together the various levels of reality are
still unknown, because the various sciences have worked mainly
on causal links internal to their regional phenomena8.
As an observable, color has ramiﬁcations into all these different
levels of reality and as we have seen the properties of color are
different in the different levels.
This is the main reason for at least some of the differences
among the different color models. Speciﬁcally, the distinction
between super-formation and super-position plays a major role.
While two different levels related by a relation of super-formation
may indeed present the same category, the internal determinants
of this category are nevertheless partially different because the cat-
egory pertains to two different categorical groups: that is to say,
it interacts with two different groups of categories. One may say
that the category seems to presents an intrinsic ambiguity. We
say “seems” because the ambiguity is not embedded in intrinsic
features of the category but depends entirely on the observer’s
shift between different levels of reality (connected by a relation of
super-formation). Reading a physical category (the three stimu-
lus codiﬁcation of a light wave) as a biological category (the three
stimulus codiﬁcation of a neural network) is a case in point.
On the other hand, levels of reality connected by a super-
position relation present a remarkably different situation. In this
latter case – and leaving universal categories aside – the categories
deﬁning the two levels are different. In this sense, no ambiguity is
likely to arise. Moreover, the two levels are connected by a relation
of existential dependence, meaning that the higher level requires
the lower one as its existential bearer. Examples from the ﬁeld of
colors are provided by the difference between warm and cold, light
and heavy, large and small colors (see Color Primitives above).
None of these properties is present in the space of physical radia-
tion. They are authentically phenomenological categories, present
only at that level of reality. On the other hand, the phenomeno-
logical level requires suitable existential bearers – and more than
one as a matter of fact: not only the brain as the bearer of the
mind, but also the body (because the brain is not an autonomous
whole)9, and the external environment. All of them are required,
and all of them are sources of possible perceptual stimulation.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, color perception is paradigmatic for its complex-
ity, including its ramiﬁcations into the physical, the neurophysi-
ological, the linguistic (and cultural) and the phenomenological
8The lack of a theory of levels of reality has possibly been the main obstruction
against development of the theories needed. Proposals concerning the architecture
of levels and their links will improve our understanding of the world and its many
dependencies. To mention but one case, the theory of levels paves the way to the
claim that there may be different families of times and spaces, each with its own
structure. We shall argue that there are numerous types of real times and spaces
endowed with structures that may differ greatly from each other. The qualiﬁer real
is mandatory, since the problem is not the trivial one that different abstract theories
of space and time can eventually be, and have been, constructed. We shall treat
the general problem of space and time as a problem of chronotopoids (understood
jointly, or separated into chronoids and topoids). The guiding intuition is that each
stratum of reality comes equipped with its own family of chronotopoids (Poli, 2007;
for further details on the theory of levels of reality, see Poli, 1998, 2001, 2006a,b,c,
2009, 2010a,b, 2011a,b, 2012).
9Here is where the connection with the theory of levels from the perspective point
of the theory of wholes becomes visible.
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domains. Some of these ramiﬁcations are simpler than others.
Not surprisingly, the phenomenological one is the most com-
plex because phenomenic color exists only in the way in which it
appears and therefore is a primarily contextual entity deeply inﬂu-
enced by interaction and assimilation (Katz, 1935) and language.
The higher complexity of color perception may partly explain the
preference shown by many experts for other points of view.
The research hypothesis that we have presented is that the the-
ory of levels may clarify some of these intricacies in the sense of
making explicit the ontological references of the various aspects of
color, and it may therefore contribute to explaining the concepts
of color used in science, phenomenology, and natural language
conceptualization.
The analysis has shown that the different models explain color
perception by encoding qualities pertaining to different levels of
reality, which implies that strictly speaking they model different
realities. However, since phenomenic color is essentially a con-
textual entity, the NCS system seems to be the model closer to
color appearances. Further studies may provide additional evi-
dence about whether the explicit connection between a model
and the level of reality that it encodes is indeed able to clarify the
relations among models themselves (an issue that may be called
“ontology as a framework for clarifying science”).
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